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Abstract 
This article examines the attitudes of US, British, and Soviet policy-makers as they planned 
for the forthcoming peace during the Second World War. It charts how they moved from 
planning a ‘peace by dictation’ of the great powers, to planning one which would be based on 
a model of collective security involving all members of the United Nations alliance. The 
latter plan would reflect both the great powers’ special responsibilities for maintaining 
international peace and security and the stake which lesser powers had in such a venture. In 
addressing these historical developments the article employs two concepts familiar to 
International Relations scholarship, namely concert and hierarchy. It shows how the 
understandings which the principal post-war planners had of these concepts – and crucially of 
their inter-relationship - changed over time and the consequences of these changes. The 
article makes two core claims: firstly, that as post-war planning progressed, the attitudes of 
the Big Three towards the acceptable nature of the great power–lesser power hierarchy 
changed radically; and secondly, that the structure and nature of today's United Nations 
Organisation is in significant part a consequence of these changes. 
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Introduction 
On 25 May 2011 US President Barrack Obama followed in the footsteps of Presidents 
Reagan and Clinton in addressing a joint sitting of the UK's Houses of Commons and Lords. 
His purpose, he said, was to ‘reaffirm one of the oldest, one of the strongest alliances the 
world has ever known’, the ‘special relationship’ between the United States of America and 
the United Kingdom. 1 In a speech which focused on the continuing centrality of the United 
State–United Kingdom alliance to global leadership, Obama repeatedly harked back to the 
role which his predecessor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and British Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill played in forging the post-war settlements which to this day continue to shape so 
much international political discourse and practice. ‘It was’, he told his audience, ‘the United 
States and the United Kingdom and [their] democratic allies that shaped a world in which 
new nations could emerge and individuals could thrive’ and in so doing they built ‘upon the 
broader belief of Roosevelt and Churchill that all nations have both rights and 
responsibilities, and all nations share a common interest in an international architecture that 
maintains the peace’. 2  
 
This article reflects on such sentiments and examines just how far the United States and Great 
Britain 3 were actually motivated by a ‘broader belief’ in an international order built on a 
shared conception of ‘rights and responsibilities’. The public pronouncements of their leaders 
certainly emphasised such notions and in particular the idea that it was the greatest powers 
that bore the greatest responsibilities for building and maintaining the post-war peace. Their 
aim, they claimed, was to establish an international order in which the strength of the most 
powerful states would be harnessed to the collective good, for the preservation of 
international order, and the protection of weak and strong alike. But does an examination of 
the debates and discussions surrounding the establishment of the United Nations Organisation 
(UNO) 4 – the institution which came into being as a consequence of the purported pursuit of 
these ideas – bear out the public rhetoric? And what of the other ‘Big Three’ 5 leaders; where 
did Soviet Premier Josef Stalin and his foreign-policy subordinates stand on such matters? 
 
This article addresses these issues. It shows how US, British, and Soviet leaders sought 
throughout the first half of the 1940s to build a sustainable post-war peace based on a great-
power concert. But more innovatively it shows how these leaders’ views of the hierarchical 
relationship between this concert and the remaining membership of international society 
changed over this period. The article makes two core claims: firstly, that as post-war planning 
progressed, the attitudes of the Big Three towards the acceptable nature of the great power–
lesser power hierarchy changed radically; and secondly, that these changes were a significant 
factor in determining the structure and nature of today's UNO. Specifically, the article argues 
that the Big Three leaders came – albeit to varying degrees – to recognise that their success as 
keepers of the peace depended not only on their material superiority and concerted action, but 
also on the broader recognition of their leadership by the other members of international 
society. Consequently, Roosevelt's initial idea that there should be ‘peace by dictation’ 6 of 
the great powers, unencumbered by the strictures of international organisation, transformed 
into a view which favoured just such a formal institutional structure, complete with the great-
power tempering which this would bring. 
 
The purpose of the article is neither to challenge the existing UN historiography nor to make 
claims which are new to the International Relations literature on the concepts of hierarchy 
and concert. Rather its objective is to draw together these two bodies of work to show how 
the post-war international order became possible, and how it could have taken a radically 
different form had the attitudinal changes noted above not occurred. It provides, therefore, an 
additional, enriching perspective rather than an alternative account. Similarly, the article does 
not assert that the issues which it discusses account fully for the great power–lesser power 
balance which characterised the first forty-five years of the UNO's existence. In this regard 
the onset of the cold war is clearly crucial, but the article does not discuss the manner in 
which the great-power discord of that era came to further enhance the role and prominence of 
less powerful states within the organisation. 7 Nevertheless, it might confidently be asserted 
that but for the changes in attitude which the article does analyse, these cold-war 
developments would not have been possible, if for no other reason than that the concert-based 
system initially anticipated would have collapsed altogether rather than have evolved as the 
UNO of the cold-war years was able to. One final limitation of the article is that whilst it says 
much about how the great powers came to agree on the overall shape and nature of the post-
war framework which they would propose to the other UN members, it does not address 
(other than in passing) the subsequent debates – between the great powers at Dumbarton 
Oaks in August 1944 and then between the UN membership as a whole at San Francisco in 
April–June 1945 – over how this framework would be operationalised. 8 Given these 
parameters, the article focuses primarily on the period August 1941 to July 1944. 
 
The article defines a concert as an arrangement between great powers in which they agree to 
co-operate with one another in the pursuit of commonly agreed goals. It defines hierarchy as 
a positional relationship between superordinate and subordinate actors. Both definitions are 
deliberately minimalist. The definition of concert leaves open for further discussion the 
motives for co-operation and bases for agreement. Similarly, the definition of hierarchy omits 
any specification of the basis for hierarchy, but the article considers various possible 
foundations, ranging from material coercion to social empowerment. No argument in favour 
of a particular understanding of hierarchy or concert is made, but the article does endorse the 
view that hierarchical and concert relations cannot be fully understood in isolation from one 
another. 
 
The article proceeds in three main sections. It begins with a theoretical discussion of the 
apparent incongruity of a hierarchical inter-state arrangement within an anarchic international 
system. This section focuses on the nature of the relationship between the great and lesser 
powers in international society. It shows how this relationship has two dimensions or axes, a 
‘horizontal concert’ axis, which encapsulates the relationship between the great powers, and a 
‘vertical hierarchy’ axis, along which the great powers relate to the remainder of international 
society. The section considers various explanations of how relations along these axes may be 
sustained – ranging from material coercion to social acceptance and empowerment – and the 
manner in which these axes relate to one another. The second section of the article focuses on 
issues relating to the horizontal axis of great-power concert relations. It shows how the Big 
Three leaderships sought to build a concert based on a complex combination of self and 
social interests and how tensions between these interests often necessitated compromises, not 
least with regard to the question of which other states might join the Big Three in the task of 
post-war policing. The section also demonstrates how the maintenance of cordiality within 
the concert was seen as essential to the successful bearing of great-power responsibility, 
before closing with a brief discussion of how this consensus alone came to be viewed as an 
insufficient basis for post-war order. Developing further this line of argument, section three 
examines issues of great power–lesser power hierarchy. It shows how initially, amongst the 
Big Three, there existed a view that hierarchy could be sustained through material means 
provided that great-power concert was maintained, and how this view gave way to a belief 
that concert had to be accompanied by social empowerment if peace were to last. The section 
charts these attitudinal changes through an examination of two key aspects of post-war 
planning, namely disarmament and the development of the organisational structure of what 
eventually became the UNO. 
 
I. Hierarchy, concert, and the great powers 
 
The notion of an international hierarchy premised on the special role and responsibilities of 
the great powers seems ill suited to an international environment populated by sovereign 
equals. Indeed, in direct opposition to hierarchy, it is the concept of anarchy which is central 
to our understanding of international relations. 9 No single scholar has done more to shape 
this view of the world than Kenneth Waltz who, in his seminal text Theory of International 
Politics, famously drew a distinction between hierarchic domestic political systems and 
anarchic international ones. According to Waltz:  
 
The parts of domestic political systems stand in relations of super- and subordination. Some 
are entitled to command; others are required to obey. Domestic systems are centralised and 
hierarchic. The parts of international-political systems stand in relations of coordination. 
Formally, each is the equal of all others. None is entitled to command; none is required to 
obey. International systems are decentralized and anarchic. The ordering principles of the two 
structures are distinctly different, indeed, contrary to each other. 10  
 
Yet despite the influence which Waltz's structural account of international politics has come 
to exert over our understanding of state interaction, it is deeply problematic for the simple 
reason that it appears to be at variance with actual state practice. As David Lake has pointed 
out: ‘There has always been a wide variety of hierarchical relationships within the 
international system … in which the sovereignty of the subordinate polity is ceded in whole 
or in part to a dominant state.’ 11  
 
Waltz provides two defences against the charge that his work fails to account for this. Firstly, 
he stresses that his approach is microtheoretical rather than practical. 12 Secondly, he 
acknowledges that, in practice, ‘all societies are mixed’ with elements of both hierarchy and 
anarchy existing side by side. 13 What enables Waltz to conceive of this mixture is the notion 
that the relative positioning of states (as either co-ordinate or alternatively as super- and 
subordinate) is ‘not fully defined by [the] system's [anarchical] ordering principle … The 
standing of units [i.e. states] also changes with changes in their relative capabilities.’ 14 On 
this basis Waltz is able to assert that hierarchy can arise as a consequence of material 
differences, with ‘those [states] of greatest capability tak[ing] on special responsibility’. 15 
Put another way, because such states have ‘a big stake in their system and the ability to act 
for its sake’ 16 they assume the superordinate position of ‘managers of international affairs’. 
17 It is important to note, however, that despite his use of the term ‘responsibility’, Waltz 
gives little credence to the idea that inter-state hierarchy is socially rather than materially 
determined. Some states may be able to command by virtue of their material superiority, but 
they are not entitled to do so by virtue of social sanction. Similarly, other states may be 
compelled to obey by virtue of prudential calculation, but they are not required to do so by 
virtue of any sense of social obligation. 
 
Other essentially capability-based accounts of great-power responsibility reject Waltz's 
assertion that ‘whatever elements of authority emerge internationally are barely once 
removed from the capability that provides the foundation for the appearance of those 
elements’. 18 Instead they explain international hierarchy and the role of the great powers 
within it by reference to super- and subordinate roles premised on authority and the 
entitlements and obligations which this entails. Inis Claude, for example, argues that because 
the material strength of the great powers ‘so determines the state of the world, we impute to 
them a duty of looking after global well-being; responsibility in the sense of causation 
implies responsibility in the sense of obligation.’ 19 In similar vein Robert Jackson argues that 
because their power enables them to ‘cause the greatest harm and do the greatest good’, 20 
great powers are ‘in a position of responsibility’ which, in turn, means that they are 
‘accountable to somebody [namely other states] and … accountable for something [namely 
their behaviour and its consequences]’. 21 In stressing not only causation as obligation but 
also responsibility as accountability and by seeing responsibility as an obligation imputed by 
others, these accounts introduce an inherently social dimension into the notion of great-power 
responsibility. This social dimension is, however, relatively thin, because while the great 
powers have to account for the manner in which they act, their responsibility to do so derives 
primarily from their material strength and the causal power to which this gives rise, rather 
than from a sense of social empowerment. 
 
More overtly social accounts of hierarchy stress that it has to be understood primarily in 
terms of an authority relationship in which a subordinate actor recognises its obligation to 
obey the commands which a superior (or superordinate) actor is entitled to give. But within 
this approach views diverge regarding exactly what authority entails. Hence for David Lake 
authority structures may depend significantly on coercion and rational calculations of self-
interest, 22 whilst for Ian Hurd and likeminded scholars the legitimacy which necessarily 
underpins authority relationships is essentially about rightfulness rather than self-interest or 
coercion. 23 Perhaps the most influential ‘social’ account of hierarchy – though one which 
largely leaves questions of authority, coercion and such like implicit – is Hedley Bull's 
exposition on the role of the great powers within international society. 24 Bull identifies the 
great powers as being those states which are, firstly, ‘comparable in status’ and members of a 
‘club with a rule of membership’ 25 ; secondly, ‘in the front rank in terms of military 
strength’, and finally and crucially, ‘recognised by others to have, and conceived by their 
own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties’. 26 Bull's formulation 
performs the critical role of demonstrating the two-dimensional nature of the great power–
lesser power relationship. The first dimension, hierarchy, relates to the relationship which the 
great powers have with the remainder of international society and it is the dimension with 
which the theoretical positions outlined above are primarily concerned. The second 
dimension, concert, relates to the relationship between the great powers themselves and is 
premised upon the rules of club membership to which Bull refers. 
 
Ian Clark's work on hegemony has done much to illuminate this two-dimensional 
relationship, examining the nature and inter-relationship of what he terms its ‘vertical 
hierarchy’ (great to lesser power) axis and its ‘horizontal concert’ (great power to great 
power) axis. 27 Crucial to this study is Clark's observation that ‘the recognition of the special 
responsibilities of the great powers’ which are the essence of their hierarchical relationship 
with the rest of international society ‘is conferred, not by the lesser members of international 
society alone’, that is, via the vertical axis, ‘but also by the other members of the peer group’, 
that is, along the horizontal axis. 28 This observation compels us to ask what it is that gives 
rise, along both axes, to the recognition and conferment to which Clark refers. The theoretical 
positions outlined above offer a number of possible answers, ranging from those premised on 
material attributes to those which depend on social acceptance, but such answers are not 
equally applicable to both axes. 
 
Along the horizontal concert axis there is limited scope for relations between the great 
powers to be influenced through material means of coercion. By definition all states in the 
rank are of (at least) roughly comparable strength and thus relatively invulnerable to 
persuasion through force. Moreover, resort to coercive measures would in all likelihood 
wreak such damage as to render the notion of a great-power club meaningless. Consequently, 
the conferment of recognition along this axis is dependent at the very least on: acceptance 
that each member of the club is of equal standing and esteem; a commonly perceived sense of 
mutual interests and obligations; and an appreciation that compromise in the pursuit of 
interests may be necessary if concerted great-power action is to be sustained. But according 
to Clark a great-power concert bound together in this way is likely to prove even more 
durable if it is underpinned not only by rationally calculated common interests, but also by 
shared values. Put another way, where members of the concert share a view that their efforts 
are in some sense of intrinsic good and in particular if they believe that they serve the society 
as a whole, then the peer pressure to act in accordance with the rules of the club will be 
further enhanced. 29  
 
Along the vertical hierarchy axis it is possible to envisage a wider spectrum of underpinnings 
for recognition and conferment of great-power responsibilities. At one end of this spectrum 
lies a Waltz-style hierarchy in which great powers exploit their material preponderance in 
order to compel lesser powers to accept their special responsibilities. Moving along the 
spectrum we find an alternative conception of hierarchy, akin to that offered by Claude and 
Jackson. Here the special role of the great powers is rooted in their material strength and the 
causal power to which this gives rise, but with the important constraining factor that great-
power behaviour is tempered by the requirement that an account be given of the manner in 
which power is exercised. Further along the spectrum we encounter accounts in which social, 
rather than material, factors become more prominent. Here we find Lake and his suggestion 
that hierarchy is based on a ‘relational conception of authority’ in which ‘authority rests on a 
bargain between the ruler and the ruled premised on the former's provision of a social order 
of value sufficient to offset the latter's loss of freedom.’ 30 But Lake's premising of authority 
on interest and coercion requires that we extend the spectrum further to include more fully 
social accounts of hierarchy such as those offered by Hurd and Clark. These see hierarchy as 
being sustainable only where it is legitimated 31 and where the great powers act in accordance 
with a ‘logic of appropriateness’ in which ‘the pursuit of purpose is associated with identities 
more than with interests.’ 32  
 
The remainder of this article utilises the theoretical frameworks set out above in order to 
interpret and enhance our understanding of the events which led to the formation of the UNO. 
It shows firstly how the thinking of the Big Three focused initially on the horizontal axis of 
great-power concert and the need to maintain good relations between the concert's members. 
Thereafter attention turns to issues relating to the vertical axis of hierarchy, with the article 
showing how this was initially understood primarily in material terms until, as plans matured, 
the great-power leaders came increasingly to recognise the need for a more socially 
empowered basis of hierarchy. The analysis also shows how, along with these changes, the 
leaders came to appreciate the inter-relationship between concert and hierarchical relations. 
 
II. The great-power concert and the post-war peace 
 
Following the visit of British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden to Washington in March 1943 
President Roosevelt held a press conference at which he lamented the lack of planning which 
had taken place prior to the establishment of the League of Nations. The message was clear: 
the United Nations would start planning now for a peace which, though perhaps still far off, 
would be more durable as a result of the thought and exchange of ideas that this would allow. 
33 Amongst all those charged with contemplating what a post-war world might look like two 
points were axiomatic. Firstly, large-scale conflict, especially involving the most powerful 
states, was not a tenable means by which to pursue inter-state relations; modern warfare was 
so costly in terms of human lives and welfare, infrastructural damage, and disruption of trade 
that mechanisms had to be found through which its future occurrence could be averted. 
Secondly, it would be for the great powers to take the lead in ensuring future peace and, in 
order for them to do so, war-time co-operation had to continue into the post-war era. The 
collapse of the League of Nations and the outbreak of the Second World War demonstrated 
what happened when great powers failed to co-operate, but by the same yardstick, the 
successful prosecution of the War showed what happened when they did. 
 
The notions that future wars must be prevented, that the actions of the great powers would be 
central to this task and that action in this cause was ultimately in the national interests of each 
of the great powers were common to the thinking of the Big Three leaderships. Nevertheless, 
for each of these states the reasoning which led to these conclusions differed. A powerful 
sense of great-power responsibility pervaded British and US planning in particular, but these 
two states also shared with the Soviet Union the inevitable desire to build a peace which 
served their own national interests. In President Roosevelt's thinking ‘the universal need for 
peace would prove to be the “common denominator” that would bring the major powers to 
form a “genuine association of interest” for this was the sine qua non of postwar stability.’ 34 
But equally US policy-makers knew only too well that, as the least war-damaged of the great 
powers, with a dominant economic position and a military capability to match, the United 
States was best placed to reap the benefits which the resumption of peaceful inter-state 
relations offered. Moreover, building a post-war world in which the United States took centre 
stage represented a decisive step in casting off the shackles of isolationism, a policy which 
key administration figures viewed as ‘unenlightened selfishness’, based on ‘folly and lack of 
vision’ 35 and with ‘suicidal’ 36 implications. 
 
For Britain's senior foreign-policy makers, great-power leadership was not simply necessary 
for the maintenance of peace and the success of a post-war security organisation: it was the 
ultimate rationale for these things. Eden set out this position succinctly in November 1942 
when advising the War Cabinet that ‘the aim of British policy must be, first, … [to] continue 
to exercise the functions and to bear the responsibilities of a world Power.’ 37 As Eden noted, 
this aim was only achievable if Britain ‘maintain[ed its] … position as an Empire and 
Commonwealth’ and with notable frankness he continued ‘we cannot realise [our objectives] 
through our own unaided efforts. We can only hope to play our part either as a European 
Power or as a world Power if we ourselves form part of a wider organisation.’ 38  
 
In its approach to planning for the post-war peace the Soviet Union sought to pursue four 
inter-related objectives. Firstly, the USSR strove for parity of prestige with the United States 
and Britain and they viewed the actual planning process and in particular their central 
involvement in it as evidence that such equality had been achieved. 39 Secondly, the Soviets 
sought a period of post-war, great-power co-operation, 40 a condition deemed essential to the 
achievement of their third goal, namely post-war recuperation and security. Finally they 
aimed, at the very least, for ideological security, and for expansion if and when possible. 
Disentangling the latter two aims is difficult, since both tended to manifest themselves in 
territorial form through a preference for pro-Soviet Eastern European neighbours. Moreover, 
whilst as Silvino Pons has argued, the urge for Soviet expansionism was primarily ‘conceived 
in a strategic context dominated by the priority of Soviet security’ 41 , for domestic political 
purposes Stalin frequently sought to legitimate such policies in terms of a mixture of 
socialism and nationalism. 42 Further complicating matters is the apparent incongruity 
between expansionism (however motivated) and collaboration, but as Eduard Mark has 
shown, for Stalin ‘imperial ambition and [the] desire to preserve the alliance were different 
aspects of a single policy.’ 43 According to this theory the spread of pro-Soviet regimes would 
result not ‘from the overt and brutal intrusions [which came to be] known to history’, but 
rather through the ‘relatively unobjectionable’, 44 organic development of indigenous 
national-front movements. Co-operation must, therefore, be continued, at least until this 
process bore fruit. Moreover, many Soviet policy-makers believed, as their Leninist 
viewpoint led them to, that by such a point the ‘inter-imperialist contradictions’ inherent in 
capitalism would have inevitably created divisions between the United States and Britain. 45 
Taken in combination these events would create an environment in which the Soviets’ 
strategic position would be greatly enhanced, but only in such a propitious world could Stalin 
contemplate future conflict with his erstwhile allies and this was very much a ‘matter for the 
distant future not the immediate present’. 46  
 
Inevitably given such divergent motivations, relations between the Big Three were at times 
strained. The Soviets feared Anglo-American connivance, 47 whilst US and British leaders 
questioned the Soviets’ trustworthiness and future intentions and on this basis initially ruled 
the Soviets out as a guardian of the post-war peace. 48 Indeed, as early as 1941 US leaders 
were privately contemplating scenarios in which military conflict with the USSR may arise. 
49 Tensions in the Anglo-US–Soviet relationship manifested themselves most clearly over 
issues such as the opening of a second front 50 , Soviet behaviour toward its immediate 
western neighbours (especially Poland) 51 , and the veto, 52 but despite such stresses, 
considerations of power, coupled with avowed Soviet commitment to the policing project, 
served to ensure its place as a planned custodian of the future peace. 53 Moreover, it would be 
wrong to suggest that this was the only fault-line within the great-power alliance. For 
instance, Britain's post-war imperial ambitions ran counter to the decolonising sentiments of 
the United States and USSR, 54 whilst Anglo-US tensions arose over US moves – initiated 
through the Atlantic Charter – to use the leverage which the war gave it over Britain to secure 
market access into British colonial territories. 55  
 
So within the Big Three triangle there existed policy tensions which at times became so 
intense as to threaten continued co-operation. 56 Given the ideological differences and 
divergent geo-strategic trajectories there is no real surprise in this. Yet against this backdrop 
the Allied leaders remained wedded to the idea of a post-war peace secured by their 
concerted action. Such views were aired publicly on numerous occasions through 
declarations such as those issued by the great-power foreign secretaries in October 1943 57 
and by their premiers following their meeting in Tehran later the same year. 58 But crucially 
the same sentiments were also expressed in private. Stalin, for example, told Polish 
Communists that ‘like any compromise the alliance contained certain divergences of aims 
and views. [But nevertheless] … there have not been any threats of disruption to the basic 
nature of the alliance.’ 59 Similarly, Secretary of State Cordell Hull's dismissal of Russia's 
actions toward Poland as a ‘piddling little thing’ which could not be allowed to get in the way 
of the ‘main issues’ of great-power co-operation demonstrated just how compromising the 
Allies were willing to be. 60 What the public and private records indicate is that there existed 
amongst the three greatest powers a determination to maintain co-operation and an 
understanding that, given the huge material strength of each, the only viable way to do this 
was through appeal to common interests and compromise. Put another way, pursuit of mutual 
interests and acceptance of the need for accommodation were recognised as the only means 
by which cohesion along the horizontal axis of great-power concert could be preserved; 
within the rank of the great powers there was little, if any, scope for the exercise of material 
might as a means to persuasion. 
 
A notable example of Big Three compromise can be found in the deliberations that took place 
over which states, if any, might join the Big Three in the post-war great-power concert. The 
first additional power to be considered for entry into this rank was China. Its advocate was 
the United States. 61 US leaders acknowledged that China did not currently meet the material 
threshold expected of a great power, but anticipated that it would do so in the future. In any 
case, counting China as a great power had a number of broader advantages from a US 
perspective: it would help stave off rising civil unrest or potential future imperial incursion 
into China; it would assist in the provision of a geo-strategic counterbalance to a resurgent 
Japan or expansionist Soviet Union; and it was likely to habitually side with the United States 
against the Soviet Union and, on issues of decolonisation, against Britain. Of course, for 
many of these same reasons Britain and the USSR objected to China's inclusion in their rank. 
Opposition was based primarily on a shared scepticism over US claims regarding China's 
material trajectory and consequently on a rejection of China as a power of equal standing. 62 
But it was supplemented for the British by apprehension regarding China's anti-imperialism 
63 and for the Soviets by fears that any strengthening of China's position would be contrary to 
Soviet strategic interests in Asia (potentially through a future anti-Soviet Sino-US axis) as 
well as that closer links to China might serve to drag the Soviets into the Pacific war. 64 
Nevertheless, both the British 65 and the Soviets reluctantly acquiesced to US demands as the 
price to be paid for ensuring continued US engagement in the building of the post-war peace. 
66  
 
Britain's championing of France's concert membership was premised predominantly on 
Churchill's preoccupation with the ‘revival of the glory of Europe’. 67 France was central to 
this vision because, as Eden told the War Cabinet in July 1943, ‘without the willing 
assistance of a rejuvenated France the problem of creating a sound and free Europe would be 
much more difficult.’ 68 British thinking was also influenced by the belief that France could 
help as a counter-balance against Germany 69 and the Soviet Union 70 , and it was also seen as 
a dependable ally on questions of empire (over which the British knew they would face US 
and Soviet opposition). 71 In a partial reversal of the consideration of China, it was now the 
Americans and Soviets who questioned the material credentials of the aspirant state, 72 with 
Soviet opposition accentuated by their scathing assessment of France's capitulation to the 
Germans. 73 US–Soviet accord also extended to their views on France's likely impact on 
future debates over colonialism, but thereafter their future geo-strategic objectives drove 
them down divergent paths on the question of French restoration, with France's potential as 
an additional counter-balance to the USSR becoming as appealing to the Americas as it was 
undesirable to the Soviets. 74 As planning progressed this factor, coupled with the view that 
France's expected leadership of the small European nations would help ‘dispel fears of four-
power dictatorship’, became decisive in US thinking. 75 Faced with this US change of heart 
the Russians accepted the idea that France be counted as a great power, the reason once again 
being ‘simply the need to keep in step with the Americans’. 76  
 
The only other state to be considered for promotion to the rank of the great powers was 
Brazil. Hull was a staunch advocate of Brazil's candidacy, citing its efforts in the war and its 
‘size, population and resources, along with her prospect of a great future’. 77 He also hoped 
that such a move would address the concerns of those Latin American states which felt 
marginalised in US post-war planning, 78 but whilst the President concurred, area specialists 
within the administration were far less enthusiastic, fearing that the promotion of Brazil 
would increase rather than placate regional sensitivities. 79 When the Americans tentatively 
raised the matter with the British and Russians they received a negative response from both; 
neither considered Brazil a great power and both balked at the disruption to their plans which 
introducing another state into their rank would cause. 80 Faced with Anglo-Soviet opposition 
and disagreement within the administration Roosevelt agreed not to push Brazil's case any 
further and no formal proposal that it be counted amongst the great powers was ever tabled. 81  
 
This examination of the issues regarding membership of the great-power rank unveils several 
important points. First, despite initial Anglo-US concerns over the Soviet Union's great-
power credentials, post-war planning amongst the Big Three soon proceeded on the basis that 
their great-power status – and hence future policing role – was beyond question. Second, the 
fact that the guardians of the peace were to be self-appointed was, particularly in the early 
phases of planning (1941–3), considered to be unproblematic. Third, this unquestioning 
approach was premised on the notion that these three states alone combined the necessary 
combination of material power and willingness to safeguard the post-war peace. Fourth, the 
Big Three leaders believed that, beyond their own self-appointment, they were entitled to 
appoint other states to join them at the top table of great powers. Fifth, those states chosen for 
such elevation did not have to satisfy the criteria against which the great-power bona fides of 
the Big Three were measured; the classification of China and France as great powers could 
not be sustained in terms of either's material strength, but the patronage of one of the Big 
Three, combined with the acquiescence of the other two, was sufficient to secure their 
promotion. Finally, one consequence of this was that throughout the period of great-power 
post-war planning neither China nor France were viewed by their effective patrons as true 
peers, with the former largely marginalised 82 and the latter totally excluded until the very 
final stages of planning in May 1945. 83 Amongst the great some were clearly greater than 
others. 
 
The preceding discussion, imbued with talk of interest and compromise, might be taken to 
suggest that in planning for the post-war peace the Big Three leaders sought to build a great-
power concert devised exclusively for the purpose of reinforcing their great-power status (an 
objective of particular importance to Britain and the USSR) and furthering their own national 
advancement. But as previously noted, concerns with national interests and the compromises 
necessary to secure them, while undeniably present, were only part of the story; the great 
powers – and in particular the United States and Britain – proceeded also on the basis that 
they had a broader social responsibility to preserve peace and provide for the security of 
weaker states. Hence, when the Americans and British deliberated over the Soviet Union's 
credibility as a future partner in global policing, they did so not because they questioned, in 
Roosevelt's words, that it had the ‘practical means of taking any effective or, at least, 
considerable part in the task’ of maintaining world peace 84 but rather because they doubted 
that Moscow was willing to ‘assume responsibilities towards the world at large’ 85 and in 
particular to accept its ‘military responsibility for maintaining order and preventing the build 
up of aggressive forces’ in the world. 86  
 
Viewed in this light the desire to pursue broader social interests can be seen as a critically 
important additional reason for wanting to maintain concert unity. Indeed, a consistent factor 
in Big Three post-war planning was the idea that what in part brought these states together – 
the desire to provide social goods – could only be achieved if they acted together and it was 
for this reason that their foreign secretaries agreed in 1943 to ‘tighten up their policies in 
regard to preventing criticisms of each other’. 87 Moreover, whilst an appreciation of the need 
for great-power unity was ever present, it was particularly important in the early stages of 
planning, when the Big Three's sense of great-power responsibility was not allied to an 
acknowledgement that such responsibility had to be socially bestowed. Hence in this phase, 
captured so graphically by Roosevelt's phrase ‘peace by dictation’, the sense of responsibility 
exhibited was highly paternalistic; the peace planned by the great powers might not be what 
the lesser powers necessarily asked for or wanted, but it would be good for them and they 
would come to appreciate it in the longer term. Such a peace could only be preserved where 
its ‘parents’ were united. 
 
Whether such a peace could ever be sustained even by great powers acting in concert is 
highly questionable. That it was ever contemplated demonstrates that some, such as 
Roosevelt and Stalin, 88 initially thought that it could. Equally, the fact that the idea was 
eventually abandoned appears to bear testament to the profound shortcomings of such an 
approach. What this in turn suggests is that to understand the dynamics of great-power 
concert, we need also to understand the relationship between the concert and the remainder of 
international society. Hence, we return to Clark's observation regarding the inextricably inter-
related nature of (the horizontal axis of) great-power concert relations and (the vertical axis 
of) great power–lesser power hierarchical relations. It follows that, having considered the 
former, we must now turn to latter. 
 
III. The evolving nature of attitudes toward post-war hierarchy 
 
Attitudinal changes toward the nature of great power–lesser power hierarchy can be 
effectively traced through an examination in particular of the evolution of US thinking about 
the post-war peace. At times this was quite heterogeneous, but with the US State Department 
the most active agent of Big Three post-war planning 89 and the United States the de facto 
senior player in the Big Three club, these ideas tended to be the most influential, with Britain 
and the Soviets, as previously noted, often acquiescent partners. 90 Two issues are particularly 
illustrative of the ways in which ideas developed in this regard. Firstly, the notion of the great 
powers as ‘policemen’, unencumbered by institutional structures, slowly gave way to 
arguments favouring more elaborate organisational frameworks incorporating the broader 
membership of international society in structures within which they could voice their 
opinions and participate in decision-making. Secondly, initial plans to concentrate the means 
of waging war exclusively in the hands of the great powers were relaxed, allowing for 
broader possession of armaments and more extensive sharing of the burdens of maintaining 
peace. 
 
The first major step in the articulation of post-war security thinking came in August 1941 at 
the Atlantic Conference where Roosevelt proposed to Churchill that Britain and the United 
States act as the world's two post-war policemen. Roosevelt's thinking, according to Herbert 
Feis, was that such a role befell these states because they were the two great powers able ‘to 
dominate the peace settlements and [with] the power to suppress aggression’. 91 Underlining 
his hierarchic credentials, the President opposed Churchill's counter-proposal for the creation 
of an ‘effective international organisation’ which would ‘afford to all states and peoples the 
means of dwelling in security’; 92 citing domestic ‘suspicions and opposition’ he said he was 
opposed to the ‘creation of a new Assembly of the League of Nations’, at least until after a 
period of time had transpired during which the two policemen ‘had had an opportunity of 
functioning’. 93 Despite this, with the support of Sumner Welles, the US Assistant Secretary 
of State, and other sympathetic US policy-makers, Churchill succeeded in getting Roosevelt 
to partially relent. The President committed to the eventual ‘establishment of a wider and 
more permanent system of general security’. 94 This was less than Churchill had hoped for, 
but the difference between the two leaders’ stances should not be exaggerated; Churchill may 
have been a more enthusiastic advocate of the establishment of an organisation to succeed the 
League, but he shared Roosevelt's view that a post-war peace should be based on a 
hierarchical arrangement within which the great powers would be at liberty to determine and 
protect the post-war peace. 95  
 
Great-power superordination was, in expanded form, publicly unfurled on 1 January 1942 
through the ‘Declaration by United Nations’ 96 in which, despite the previously noted 
concerns and objections, the Soviet Union and China ‘officially’ joined the United States and 
Britain in the great-power rank. With the titles of these four states appearing ahead of those 
of the others signatories, the Declaration was intended by Roosevelt to emphasise the 
dominant leadership role of the great powers. 97 Such a move was no mere diplomatic nicety. 
As Roosevelt told Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov some five months later, he ‘conceived 
it the duty of the four major United Nations … to act as the policemen of the world’ whose 
role would be to ‘impose peace’; 98 for the President the hierarchy of signatures would be 
transposed into a hierarchy in political reality. Sharing the President's reluctance to re-
establish a ‘League-style’ international organisation and supportive of his hierarchical 
approach, Molotov approved of the plan. More importantly, so did Stalin. 99  
 
Against this early diplomatic backdrop the ‘Declaration of Four Nations on General 
Security’, negotiated by the foreign secretaries of the Big Three but also signed up to by 
China and issued following the Moscow Conference of October 1943, heralded a less 
dictatorial approach to the maintenance of post-war peace. 100 Reflecting the work and 
preferences of the State Department (and the British Foreign Office) and building on 
discussions which had taken place between the United States and Britain (plus Canada) at the 
First Quebec Conference in August 1943 101 , it subtly recast post-war priorities, maintaining 
the hierarchical dominance of the great powers but stressing the ‘necessity to establish at the 
earliest practicable date a general international organisation’. 102 This declaration reflected the 
moderating approach which, under the counsel and influence of foreign-policy advisors such 
as Welles and Hull, Roosevelt was now beginning to adopt toward post-war policing. Welles, 
the President's close advisor and confident, had always questioned his original ‘policemen’ 
model, believing that it failed to take account of the national pride, inter-state rivalries, and 
legitimate governmental responsibilities of the lesser powers. 103 Of similar mind (at least on 
this point), Hull returned from the Moscow conference and told Congress of plans to 
establish an organisation comprising ‘all peace loving states, irrespective of size and strength, 
[acting] as partners in a future system of general security’. 104 Such sentiments echoed the 
prevailing attitude and approach within the State Department which favoured the building of 
a more inclusive institution attuned to the sensitivities of states both large and small. 
 
Roosevelt's increasing receptivity to arguments favouring models of peace reliant less on 
great-power dictation and more on inclusivity and participation – or less on coercion and 
more on social empowerment – was a crucial determinant of US post-war planning. 
Nevertheless, as the model which he outlined when the Big Three premiers met in Tehran in 
November 1943 showed, at this stage the President remained firmly committed to a 
hierarchical structure in which the great powers would dominate. His preference was for a 
three-tier structure, with the whole membership of the UN meeting in a discursive and 
advisory body (later to be called the ‘General Conference’), an ‘Executive Committee’ 
comprised of ten states including the four great powers but with only recommendatory 
powers and a grouping of the ‘Four Policemen’ sitting in splendid isolation with the authority 
to deal decisively with disputes, using force if necessary. 105  
 
This plan was modelled on the first draft constitution to emerge from the intensive discussion 
and planning which took place within the State Department during 1943. 106 In later plans the 
idea of a three-tier structure was streamlined to two, but there was a degree of equivocation 
over whether it should in effect be the Four Policemen or the Executive Council which 
should be jettisoned. 107 This uncertainty reflected the predicament in which US planners 
found themselves. On the one hand they were reluctant to propose plans which did not accord 
with the President's view that ‘the real decisions should be made by the United States, Great 
Britain, Russia and China, who would be the powers for many years to come that would have 
to police the world.’ 108 On the other hand, in keeping with the general departmental 
preference noted above, they felt that a structure in which the four great powers sat alone in 
an executive council, unaccountable to others and monopolising effective power, would be 
too ‘top heavy’, giving insufficient voice and too little responsibility to the lesser powers. 109 
It was Roosevelt's eventual acceptance of the latter line of argument – a move which took 
him another step farther from a peace based on dictation and coercion and a step closer to one 
premised on inclusion and empowerment – which resolved this dilemma. By the Dumbarton 
Oaks conference of August 1944 the final US blueprint for a post-war security organisation 
was based on a ‘General Assembly’ of all members and an eleven-member ‘Executive 
Council’ comprised of the four great powers (plus France once its governmental status was 
clarified) and the seven elected states (decreasing to six once France assumed its seat). 110  
 
A similar transformation to that outlined above occurred with regard to US thinking about 
how great-power hierarchy should be reflected in the possession by states of military means. 
In the Atlantic Charter the United States and Britain had declared that the disarmament of 
aggressive, or potentially aggressive states was ‘essential’, whilst all other states, they agreed, 
should be ‘aid[ed] and encourage[d]’ to take ‘practical measures which will lighten for peace-
loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments’. For Roosevelt such burdens were not only 
‘crushing’ but also futile – because armaments were ineffective as a means of protecting the 
weak from the strong – and unnecessary within the type of system of great-power policing 
which he envisaged. When later telling Molotov of his idea that ‘all other nations save the 
Big Four should be disarmed’, Roosevelt acknowledged that what he was contemplating 
amounted to ‘peace by dictation’, but, he maintained, ultimately its benefits would become 
apparent. 111  
 
But with the acceptance that the lesser powers should be included within the membership of a 
post-war peace organisation came also an acknowledgement that they should contribute 
toward the maintenance of world peace. Modified to account for this view, US planning 
during much of 1943 incorporated the idea that membership of the post-war organisation 
would entail the acceptance of minimum and maximum levels of armament, with failure to 
arm within these parameters constituting a threat to the peace which could give rise to 
enforcement action led by the great powers. 112 But this idea of prescribed armaments levels 
was, in turn, rejected as being too complicated to garner US public support and too inflexible 
and it was replaced by a commitment to regulate armaments and control the manufacture and 
trade in arms. 113 A statement prepared by Hull and his State Department team, but approved 
and delivered in June 1944 by the now converted Roosevelt, captures well the new approach:  
 
The maintenance of peace and security must be the joint task of all peace loving nations. … 
We are seeking effective agreement and arrangements through which the nations would 
maintain, according to their capacities, adequate forces to meet the needs of preventing war 
and of making impossible deliberate preparation for war and to have such forces available for 
joint action when necessary. 114  
 
Similar evolutionary steps had been taken by British and Soviet planners, such that by the 
time the great-power delegations came to meet at Dumbarton Oaks in August 1944 to agree a 
draft charter for the proposed global security organisation there was considerable common 
ground regarding structure and disarmament. 115 On the former both the British 116 and Soviet 
117 plans concurred with that of the Americans, envisaging an assembly comprising all 
members of the organisation and some form of council involving the four great powers and a 
small number of other member states. On the issue of disarmament there was greater 
dissention, with the US and Soviet drafts making (somewhat vague) reference to the idea, but 
the British, ever sceptical on the topic, eschewing references to either disarmament or arms 
reductions. The British preference was instead to speak of the regulation of armaments linked 
to the ability of states to meet their responsibilities toward the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 118 Despite initially being the minority view, it was this approach which 
ultimately garnered most support. Consequently the notion of arms ‘reduction’ was wholly 
absent for the conference's final draft and ‘disarmament’, whilst still mentioned, was 
relegated from a compulsory area of Council jurisdiction to a matter within the Assembly's 
non-compulsory remit. 
 
What the above account reveals is the distance which the Big Three allies had travelled in the 
three years since 1941 when Roosevelt had broached with Churchill the most appropriate 
means of preserving post-war peace. The idea of ‘peace by dictation’ had given way to a far 
more consultative approach in which the great powers, though still dominant, would be 
obliged to confer with and persuade lesser powers in order to act in the name and for the sake 
of the post-war peace. Similarly, the idea of a world in which, in Roosevelt's words, ‘the 
small powers might have rifles, but nothing more dangerous’ 119 was rejected in favour of one 
in which all of the United Nations would possess a level of arms commensurate with their 
domestic and, more significantly, their international responsibilities. This constituted a 
fundamental reassessment of the great power–lesser power hierarchy. Throughout the whole 
of the planning process the Big Three proceeded on the agreed assumption that ‘the Great 
Powers would necessarily bear the major responsibility for peace’, 120 but they ultimately 
came to accept that this was not their exclusive responsibility. In its final guise responsibility 
for the guardianship of post-war peace would lay in the hands of an organisation comprising 
the whole of the UN, with each member having a say in its running and being expected to 
contribute towards its primary function of keeping the peace. This is not, of course, to suggest 
that a significant element of hierarchy would not prevail. Each of the Big Three's plans 
anticipated a council predominating over issues of security and military enforcement with the 
great powers in turn predominating over the council with permanent membership, the ability 
to veto certain decisions 121 and the expectation that they would provide the vast bulk of the 
material resources on which it would depend. But it was a far cry from what had first been 
envisaged in 1941; this would not be a hierarchy premised primarily on dictatorial coercion 
but rather one based on a collectivised notion of security, with each state contributing to the 
maintenance of order in accordance with its capacity to do so. 
 
Alongside this acknowledgement of shared responsibility came an acceptance of the need for 
enhanced great-power accountability and social empowerment. A degree of sensitivity to the 
probable concerns of those facing the prospect of great-power domination had been evident 
even in 1941; Roosevelt, leading proponent of the ‘policemen’ plan, had been ‘concerned to 
emphasise the “trustee” aspect of the four policemen's role and to take the edge off their 
dominant position in a world otherwise totally disarmed 122 But the issue of consultation and 
engagement with the lesser powers had created a dilemma for the Big Three. The ironing out 
in secret of any differences of opinion over the post-war peace would ensure that the 
important sense of great-power unity could be maintained before other states. But conversely, 
as Hull noted, if the great-power negotiations went ‘on until they turned out to the world a 
completed document and then undertook to send copies to the small nations in a “take it or 
leave it” manner’, resentment would surely ensue. 123 As such, any attempt to impose peace 
on the world bore within it its own seeds of destruction. For their part the British response to 
the conundrum was to engage with the Dominion governments, with policies on both parts 
being modified as a consequence. 124 Bereft of such a political sphere of influence the 
Russians did not engage in any similar discussions and, despite the opportunity which 
western hemispheric relations presented, the United States chose not to do so until a point 
which was seen by their southern neighbours as largely too late. 125  
 
These differing attitudes to consultation were in part driven by the relative material strengths 
and trajectories of the Big Three. It was no coincidence that the most consultative member of 
the group, Britain, was also the one facing a waning of material might. Contemplating such a 
predicament the Foreign Office knew that Britain's global standing could only be maintained 
through an engagement with and coupling to the Dominions. But material considerations 
provide only a partial account; an attitudinal change had also occurred. Hence, when Stalin 
railed against the idea that the great powers might be subjected to the judgement of the small, 
Churchill retorted that ‘it was essential that they exercise their power with moderation and 
with respect for the rights of the smaller nations.’ 126 Roosevelt supported Churchill's stance. 
127 So whatever the lingering allure which great-power exceptionalism continued to 
occasionally exert over the three premiers 128 , the die was now cast; whilst great-power 
concert would prevail, it would be located within a broad organisational framework which 
would in turn be premised not on a materially determined ability to dictate, but rather on the 
assent of the UN membership. Many details were yet to be determined and these would be 
argued over by the great powers at Dumbarton Oaks and by the whole UN membership when 
it met at San Francisco to consider proposals which were unrecognisable from those which 
Roosevelt had first presented to Churchill and later to Molotov. But by July 1944 a 
fundamental point had been agreed; the basic notion of peace by dictation had been rejected 
in favour of peace by social sanction. 
 
For each of the Big Three this process of transformation had been different. It was most 
dramatic for the United States whose President, the original advocate of the ‘policemen’ plan, 
was ultimately amongst the strongest advocates of broad-based global organisation. In terms 
of the hierarchy spectrum presented earlier, initial US thinking, at least as presented by 
Roosevelt, was heavily premised on acquiescence secured through the prospect of material 
coercion. It also entailed a commitment to the service of social interest based on a sense of 
great-power responsibility, but it did not attach any great significance to the need for great-
power accountability or social empowerment. But as Roosevelt's views came more into line 
with those of his State Department advisors this approach was rejected and the more 
inclusive, assent-based model outlined above was adopted. Through this move US policy 
shifted, rejecting the idea of a materially imposed hierarchy in favour of a socially bestowed 
one. 
 
For British policy-makers the transformative journey was shorter, essentially because they 
began the journey at a point closer to the final destination. At least within the corridors of the 
Foreign Office there was a long-standing preference for a more inclusive post-war 
arrangement which, though based on a hierarchy of material difference, nevertheless 
recognised the importance of lesser-power endorsement. Eden had found Roosevelt's initial 
‘sweeping opinions’ on great-power policing and global disarmament ‘alarming in their 
cheerful fecklessness’, 129 and along with his ministry colleagues he was from the outset far 
more positively disposed to the approach which Washington eventually came to advocate. 
This was less true of Churchill – whose vacillating approach often favoured a more regionally 
segregated, great-power-based approach to peace 130 – but the Prime Minister's preoccupation 
with prosecuting the war resulted in his relative disengagement with post-war planning and 
the minimisation of the effect of his views on the matter. 131 Consequently unencumbered, it 
was Foreign Office thinking, reflective of Britain's colonial position, its close relationship 
with the Dominions, but also its waning material power, which proved most influential. This 
position was attuned to the need to develop an inclusive global security structure within 
which all states – and in particular the Dominions – could contribute toward the maintenance 
of peace. 132 This view was well captured in Britain's submission to the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference which stated that ‘in general, as regards all states, the more power and 
responsibility can be made to correspond, the more likely it is that the machinery [of peace] 
will be able to fulfil its functions.’ 133 From the outset British planners placed relatively little 
faith in the merits of a coercive hierarchy and sought instead to build a post-war peace 
premised on a socially empowered sense of great-power responsibility. 
 
For the Soviets the journey was also a relatively short one, but in their case this was because 
they did not travel as far along the track rather than because they started further down it. At 
the outset Stalin embraced Roosevelt's initial plan that the great powers utilise their material 
superiority to act as the world's ‘policemen’ and he had, in fact, independently suggested 
such an idea to Eden in December 1941. 134 Whilst Molotov had warned Roosevelt in 1942 
that his policing system would ‘be a bitter blow to the prestige’ of key states such as France 
and Turkey 135 , such concerns were never so great an impediment for the Soviets as to render 
the plan either unattractive or unworkable. Pursuant to their broader strategic objectives the 
Soviets proved acquiescent on this matter, but as such they remained the least enthusiastic of 
the Big Three in terms of the move towards a more socially empowered vision of what 
eventually became the UNO. 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the Big Three policy-makers responsible for post-war planning the essentiality of great-
power concert was clear; great-power discord was a recipe for war and great-power war was 
not conducive to their national interests. But beyond this, concert was also viewed as the only 
plausible means through which the responsibilities attendant to great power could be realised. 
Peace served the interests of great and small alike, for the security of the latter could only be 
preserved if the former foreswore predatory intent and pledged themselves to the preservation 
of the independence of all. In this sense of inter-dependency lay the rationale for great 
power–lesser power hierarchy. The material might of the powerful meant not only that they 
could adopt a position of superordination, but also that they should do so. 
 
That such reasoning underpinned the approach of British and US policy-makers – and 
perhaps, to a far lesser extent, Soviet ones – seems clear from the foregoing analysis. It sets 
out the inter-relationship between great-power concert – the horizontal axis of the framework 
of analysis – and great power–lesser power hierarchy: the vertical axis. But what it leaves 
unspecified is the basis for maintaining these axial relations. Along the horizontal axis of 
great-power concert there was little scope for the basing of relations on anything other than 
shared interests and, it was hoped, values. This is evident from the compromises which the 
Big Three were willing to strike as they proceeded with post-war planning, fully cognisant of 
the fact that an attempt to coerce any other member of the concert was likely to prove futile 
and indeed, to destroy the very pact upon which all depended. 
 
But along the vertical axis there existed a greater degree of potential variation in the manner 
in which relations might be maintained. This is evident from the fact that, when post-war 
planning commenced, it was assumed that the great powers would be able to impose their 
preferred peace on the lesser powers. This might not seem controversial when viewed from 
an asocial perspective which focuses on material strength and the coercive capacity to which 
it gives rise. But this is not what US and British planners appear to have had in mind, since 
their objective was an inherently social one – the prevention of war for the sake of great and 
lesser powers alike – although they initially believed that it could be materially imposed. 
From this highly paternalistic standpoint there appeared to be no incompatibility between 
ends and means.As planning progressed, however, the contradictions in this approach became 
steadily more apparent. Great power ‘peace by dictation’ would deprive the lesser powers of 
their rightful stake in the peace and in so doing would make its maintenance all the more 
challenging. Conversely, to recognise this stake, to accept the contribution which the lesser 
powers could make to the peace, and to acknowledge that with the great powers’ primary (but 
not exclusive) responsibility for peace came a need for accountability to the broader 
membership of international society would anchor peace in a bedrock of social empowerment 
which would enhance its perceived legitimacy and hence its sustainability. 
 
In this context the virtue of concert was to be found not in the overwhelming capacity which 
united action gave the great to coerce the weak. Instead it lay firstly in the demonstrative 
willingness of the great powers to compromise and to curb their behaviour for the sake of the 
collective good and secondly in the viability which such self-imposed restraint gave to such a 
project. That the peace which was intended to ensue also served the interests of the powerful 
does not run counter to this point, for as the Second World War so terribly demonstrated, 
when great powers fight, the weak suffer all the more. It was through this change in attitude 
toward the value of great-power concert that the UNO came to take shape. Atlantic Charter-
style ‘peace by dictation’ required only great-power unity, since dictation negated the need 
for complex organisational encumbrances. But by the closing stages of the war, the notion of 
concert coupled with hierarchy by dictation had been rejected. In its place came the embrace 
of concert with hierarchy by social sanction. The practical embodiment of this social 
acceptance was (and remains) the United Nations Organisation. 
 
It can be concluded that, but for the profound shift in attitude toward great power–lesser 
power hierarchy analysed above, an institution such as the UNO would never have come into 
being. The continuation of an approach based on ‘peace by dictation’ would, in all likelihood, 
have resulted in an attempt to build a post-war peace more akin to that seen at the end of the 
Napoleonic wars, and with some confidence we might speculate that the onset of the cold war 
would have quite rapidly brought such a venture to a premature end. But it would be 
imprudent to suggest that this attitudinal shift was alone responsible for shaping the post-war 
peace, be it at gestation, inception, or during the decades which followed. Crucial as this 
changed perspective on hierarchy was, it must also be acknowledged that deteriorating 
relations within the concert – that is to say, along the horizontal axis – also had a profound 
effect on the form which the UNO was to take and, it may be conceded, especially on the 
practices which it adopted during the subsequent forty-five years of its existence. Yet the 
nascence of the cold war does not negate the thesis offered here. Rather an appreciation of the 
attitudinal developments which are the concern of this article, in conjunction with an 
understanding of the established portrayal of deteriorating Big Three relations, provides 
greater depth to our knowledge of the developments surrounding the dawning of the UN era. 
Moreover, this provides further support for the assertion that relations along the horizontal 
and vertical axes cannot be considered in isolation. Hence, if we are to understand how the 
UNO came into being, we must consider not only how the great powers related to one 
another, but also how they related to the wider membership of international society. 
 
Despite his sometimes vacillating attitude to the matter, Churchill captured well the sentiment 
which ultimately came to prevail amongst the great powers when he addressed the House of 
Commons on his return from Yalta:  
 
It is [he said] on the Great Powers that the chief burden of maintaining peace and security 
will fall. The new world organisation must take into account this special responsibility of the 
Great Powers, and must be so framed as not to compromise their unity or their capacity for 
effective action if it is called for at short notice. At the same time, the world organisation 
cannot be based upon a dictatorship of the Great Powers. It is their duty to serve the world 
and not to rule it. 136  
 
We might well question whether the great powers have lived up to this duty, but the influence 
which its sense exerted during the latter stages of the Second World War did much to shape 
the world in which we live today. 
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